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1 Introduction
Abstract machines as well as abstract data types can be speciﬁed in
CafeOBJ[4], an algebraic speciﬁcation language. Algebraic speciﬁcations of
abstract machines are called behavioral speciﬁcations. Behavioral speciﬁca-
tions are written in equations, which are regarded as rewrite rules and used to
verify behavioral speciﬁcations. Rewriting is an eﬃcient way of implementing
equational reasoning, which is the most fundamental way of reasoning and
can moderate the diﬃculties of proofs that might otherwise become too hard
to understand.
We use observational transition systems (OTSs; which are transition sys-
tems that can be straightforwardly written in equations) as abstract machines
and have been developing a method of verifying behavioral speciﬁcations.
The method is called the OTS/CafeOBJ method[15]. In the OTS/CafeOBJ
method, a system is modeled as an OTS, the OTS is written in CafeOBJ
and it is veriﬁed that the OTS has properties by writing proofs (called proof
scores) in CafeOBJ and checking the proof scores by means of rewriting. We
have been demonstrating its usefulness by doing case studies, among which
are [13,14,17]. In the case studies, however, basically proof scores were entirely
written by hand using usual text editors such as Emacs, which is subject to
human errors such that some cases to consider may be overlooked.
We have then designed and implemented a toolkit called Buﬀet, which
assists veriﬁcation in the OTS/CafeOBJ method. Given predicates used to
split cases and lemmas, Buﬀet automatically generates proof scores and checks
the proof scores using the CafeOBJ system. Although the success of a proof
depends on given predicates for case analysis and lemmas, it is guaranteed
that generated proof scores cover all cases, excluding human errors. Buﬀet
also has facilities to display proof scores generated and veriﬁcation results on
a web browser. Since Buﬀet only displays by default parts of a proof score
hierarchically for which further case analysis should be done and/or lemmas
should be used, the facilities can help users ﬁnd how to split cases and what
lemmas to use. The facilities can also help users read and understand proof
scores. In this paper we describe Buﬀet and report on a case study that Buﬀet
has been applied to a simple mutual exclusion protocol.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that there exists a universal state space denoted by Υ and data
types used, including the equivalence relation denoted by = for each data
type, have been deﬁned. An OTS[15] S consists of 〈O, I, T 〉 such that 1) O :
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a set of observers; each o ∈ O is a function o : Υ → D, where D is a data
type and may diﬀer from observer to observer; given two states υ1, υ2 ∈ Υ, the
equivalence (υ1 =S υ2) between them wrt S is deﬁned as ∀o ∈ O.o(υ1) = o(υ2),
2) I : the set of initial states such that I ⊆ Υ, and 3) T : a set of conditional
transitions; each τ ∈ T is a function τ : Υ → Υ such that τ(υ1) =S τ(υ2)
for each [υ] ∈ Υ/=S and each υ1, υ2 ∈ [υ]; τ(υ) is called the successor state
of υ ∈ Υ wrt τ ; the condition cτ of τ is called the eﬀective condition. An
execution of S is an inﬁnite sequence υ0, υ1, . . . of states satisfying Initiation
(υ0 ∈ I) and Consecution (∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. ∃τ ∈ T .(υi+1 =S τ(υi))). A state υ
is called reachable wrt S iﬀ there exists an execution of S in which υ appears.
Properties discussed in this paper are invariants only. A predicate p is called
invariant wrt S iﬀ p(υ) holds for every reachable state υ wrt S. Observers and
transitions may be parameterized, which are generally expressed as oi1,...,im :
Υ→ Di and τj1,...,jn : Υ → Υ, provided that m,n ≥ 0 and there exists a data
type Dk such that k ∈ Dk for k = i1, . . . , im, j1, . . . , jn.
CafeOBJ[4] (see www.ldl.jaist.ac.jp/cafeobj/) is an algebraic speciﬁcation
language/system mainly based on order-sorted algebras[6] and hidden-sorted
algebras[5,9]. Abstract machines as well as abstract data types can be speciﬁed
in CafeOBJ, which has two kinds of sorts: visible and hidden sorts denoting
abstract data types and the state spaces of abstract machines, and two kinds
of operators wrt hidden sorts: action and observation operators that denote
state transitions of abstract machines and let us know the state of abstract
machines. Both an action operator and an observation operator take a state
of an abstract machine and zero or more data, an action operator returns the
successor state and an observation operator returns a value that characterizes
the state of an abstract machine. The syntax of operator declarations is
[b]op OpName : Sort* -> Sort
bop is used for action and observation operators, while op for others. Opera-
tors are deﬁned with equations. The syntax of equation declarations is
[c]eq Term = Term [if Term] .
ceq is used for conditional equations, while eq for non-conditional ones. The
CafeOBJ system uses equations as rewrite rules and rewrites terms. CafeOBJ
is also based on rewriting logic. The syntax of rewriting rules is
trans Term => Term .
In Buﬀet, rewriting rules are used to instruct Buﬀet to generate proof scores.
Basic units of CafeOBJ speciﬁcations are modules. The CafeOBJ system
provides built-in modules where basic data types such as truth values are
speciﬁed. The module of truth values is BOOL. Since truth values are indis-
pensable for conditional equations, BOOL is automatically imported by almost
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every module unless otherwise stated. The import of BOOL lets us use visible
sort Bool denoting truth values, constants true and false denoting true and
false, and operators denoting some basic logical operators. Among the oper-
ators are not_, _and_, _or_, _xor_, _implies_ and _iff_ denoting negation
(¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), exclusive disjunction (xor), implication
(⇒) and logical equivalence (⇔), respectively. The conditional choice oper-
ator if_then_else_fi is also available. An underscore _ indicates the place
where an argument is put. BOOL plays an essential role in veriﬁcation with
the CafeOBJ system. If the equations available in the module are regarded
as rewrite rules, they are complete wrt propositional logic. Therefore, any
term denoting a propositional formula that is always true (or false) surely
reduces to true (or false). Generally, a term of Bool reduces to an exclusive
disjunction of conjunctions.
S is written in CafeOBJ. Υ is denoted by a hidden sort, say H, odi1 ,...,dim
by a CafeOBJ observation operator, say o, and τdj1 ,...,djn by a CafeOBJ action
operator, say a; o and a are declared as
bop o : H Vi1 . . . Vim -> Vi bop a : H Vj1 . . . Vjn -> H
Vk is a visible sort corresponding to Dk for k = i1, . . . , im, i, j1, . . . , jn. Any
state in I, i.e. any initial state, is denoted by a constant, say init declared as
op init : -> H
We suppose that the initial value of each oi1,...,im is f(i1, . . . , im). The initial
value of each oi1,...,im is speciﬁed with the equation
eq o(init,Xi1 , . . . ,Xim) = f(Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) .
Xk is a CafeOBJ variable of sort Vk for k = i1, . . . , im and f(Xi1 , . . . ,Xim) is a
CafeOBJ term denoting f(i1, . . . , im). Each τj1,...,jn may change the value of
each oi1,...,im if it is applied in a state υ such that cτj1,...,jn holds, which can be
written as
ceq o(a(S,Xj1 , . . . ,Xjn),Xi1 , . . . ,Xim) = e-a(S,Xj1 , . . . ,Xjn ,Xi1 , . . . ,Xim )
if c-a(S,Xj1 , . . . ,Xjn) .
S is a CafeOBJ variable of H and each Xk is a CafeOBJ variable of Vk.
a(S,Xj1 , . . . ,Xjn) denotes the successor state of S wrt τj1,...,jn. e-a(S,Xj1, . . . ,
Xjn,Xi1, . . . ,Xim) denotes the value of oi1,...,im in the successor state. c-a(S,
Xj1, . . . ,Xjn) denotes cτj1,...,jn . τj1,...,jn changes nothing if it is applied in a state
υ such that cτj1,...,jn does not hold, which can be written as
ceq a(S,Xj1 , . . . ,Xjn) = S if not c-a(S,Xj1 , . . . ,Xjn) .
If the value of oi1,...,im is not aﬀected by applying τj1,...,jn in any state (regardless
of the truth value of cτj1,...,jn ), the following equation may be declared:
eq o(a(S,Xj1 , . . . ,Xjn),Xi1 , . . . ,Xim) = o(S,Xi1 , . . . ,Xim ) .
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3 Proof Scores
We describe proof scores showing that a predicate p1 is invariant wrt S, which
are written in CafeOBJ. We often need other predicates, say p2, . . . , pn, for
the veriﬁcation, although such predicates should be found during the veriﬁ-
cation. Let xi1, . . . , ximi , whose types are Di1, . . . , Dimi, be all free variables
in pi except υ, whose type is Υ, for i = 1, . . . , n. pi may be written as
pi(υ, xi1, . . . , ximi).
Although some invariant properties may be proved by rewriting and case
analysis only with other proved invariant properties, we often need induction,
especially simultaneous induction[15] on the number of transitions applied.
We ﬁrst declare the operators denoting p1, . . . , pn and the equations deﬁn-
ing the operators. The operators and equations are declared in a module, say
INV (which imports the module where S is written), as
op invi : H Vi1 . . .Vimi -> Bool
eq invi(S,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi) = pi(S,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi) .
for i = 1, . . . , n. Vk is a visible sort denoting Dk and Xk is a CafeOBJ variable
of Vk for k = i1, . . . , imi. pi(S,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi) is a CafeOBJ term denoting pi.
In module INV, we also declare a constant xk denoting an arbitrary value of
Vk for k = 1, . . . , n.
We then declare the operators denoting basic formulas to show in the
inductive cases and the equations deﬁning the operators. The operators and
equations are declared in a module, say ISTEP (which imports INV), as follows:
op istepi : Vi1 . . .Vimi -> Bool
eq istepi(Xi1, . . . ,Ximi) = invi(s,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi) implies invi(s
′,Xi1, . . . ,Ximi) .
for i = 1, . . . , n. s and s′, which are declared in module ISTEP, are constants
of H; s denotes an arbitrary state and s′ a successor state of the state.
For the base case, we write
open INV
red invi(init, xi1, . . . , ximi ) .
close
for i = 1, . . . , n. CafeOBJ command open makes a temporary module that
imports a module given as an argument and CafeOBJ command close de-
stroys the temporary module. Parts enclosed with open and close are basic
units of proof scores, which are called proof passages in the OTS/CafeOBJ
method.
For the induction case showing that each τj1,...,jmj (denoted by action op-
erator a) preserves each pi, we often need case analysis. We suppose that the
state space is split into l sub-spaces for the induction case, although such case
analysis should be done during the veriﬁcation. Each of the l subcases is sup-
posed to be characterized by a predicate caseik for k = 1, . . . , l; the predicates
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Fig. 1. An overview of the Buﬀet toolkit.
should satisfy (casei1 ∨ . . . ∨ case il) ⇔ true. For the induction case, we then
write
open ISTEP
-- arbitrary objects
op y
1m1
: -> V1m1 . . . . op yjmj
: -> Vjmj .
-- assumptions
Declaration of equations denoting case ik .
-- successor state
eq s′ = a(s, yj1 , . . . , yjmj
) .
-- check
red SIHi implies istepi(xi1, . . . , ximi) .
close
for i = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , l. A comment starts with -- and ter-
minates at the end of the line. SIHi is used to strengthen the induction
hypothesis invi(s, xi1, . . . , ximi) and is the form invι1(s, tι11, . . .) and . . . and
invικ(s, tικ1, . . .), where 1 ≤ ι1, . . . , ικ ≤ n and each tk is a term of sort Vk.
4 Buﬀet: A Toolkit for the OTS/CafeOBJ Method
Buﬀet is a toolkit for generating and displaying proof scores. An overview of
Buﬀet is shown in Fig. 1. Buﬀet consists of the Buﬀet server, Gateau (a Buﬀet
client), PSP (Proof Score Presenter) and the CafeOBJ system. Gateau takes
three kinds of ﬁles: spec.mod in which an OTS S is speciﬁed in CafeOBJ,
inv.mod in which modules INV and ISTEP are declared, and script.mod in
which a script to instruct Gateau to generate a proof score is written. Gateau
communicates with the CafeOBJ system via the Buﬀet server using the HTTP
protocol and an inter-process communication (IPC) method. Given spec.mod,
inv.mod and script.mod, then Gateau passes them into the CafeOBJ system,
generates a proof score based on some information extracted from the three
ﬁles and passes the proof score into the CafeOBJ system. Gateau then receives
the results of rewriting the proof score from the CafeOBJ system, generates
a ﬁle proof.xml in XML from the proof score and the results, and passes the
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ﬁle to PSP. PSP then generates a ﬁle proof.html in HTML from proof.xml to
display the proof score and the results on a web browser. In the rest of the
section, we describe the Buﬀet server, Gateau and PSP.
4.1 The Buﬀet Server
The Buﬀet server provides the ﬁve services: 1) to create a new session, 2) to
have the CafeOBJ system load ﬁles, 3) to obtain a module information from
the CafeOBJ system, reconstruct the module as an XML document and pass
it to a client, 4) to have the CafeOBJ system reduce a term under a module
and pass the result reconstructed as an XML document to a client, and 5) to
ﬁnish the current session.
We describe the ﬁve services in turn. When requested by a client, the
Buﬀet server creates a new session for the client, starting the CafeOBJ system
as its child process and establishing an IPC connection between the server
process and the child process. After that, the client can communicate with
the CafeOBJ system via the Buﬀet server. CafeOBJ command in is used
to load ﬁles into the CafeOBJ system. The Buﬀet server has the CafeOBJ
system load a ﬁle by sending command in and the ﬁle name to the CafeOBJ
system. CafeOBJ command show is used to parse modules and use the results
of parsing them, provided that switch tree print is set to on. The Buﬀet
server has the CafeOBJ system parse a module by sending command show and
the module name to the CafeOBJ system, reconstructs the module as an XML
document based on the result of parsing the module and passes it to a client.
The Buﬀet server has the CafeOBJ system reduce a term under a module by
sending command red, the term and the module name, reconstructs the result
term as an XML document and passes it to a client. At the end of a session,
the Buﬀet server ﬁnishes the session by stopping the CafeOBJ system.
The current implementation of the Buﬀet server is written in Perl and
consists of about 1,200 lines.
4.2 Gateau
Gateau has the ﬁve commands new, input, parse, verify and quit. Com-
mands new and quit correspond to the ﬁrst and ﬁfth services provided by the
Buﬀet server. Command input takes a ﬁle name as its argument and uploads
the ﬁle to the Buﬀet server, which does the second service. Command parse
takes the name of a module in which an OTS S is supposed to be speciﬁed and
passes it to the Buﬀet server, which does the third service; Gateau extracts
the action operators denoting the transitions of S and their (eﬀective) condi-
tions from the module (which is an XML document) returned by the Buﬀet
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server. The action operators and their conditions are used to generate proof
scores showing that predicates are invariant wrt S. Command verify takes
the name of a module in which a proof script is supposed to be written for the
proof that a predicate is invariant wrt S and passes it to the Buﬀet server,
which does the third service; Gateau generates a proof score based on the
module (which is an XML document) returned by the Buﬀet server and the
information obtained by command parse. For each proof passage of the proof
score, Gateau makes a module corresponding to the proof passage (excluding
the statement containing CafeOBJ command red), uploads the module to the
Buﬀet server so as to have the CafeOBJ system load the module, asks the
Buﬀet server to has the CafeOBJ system reduce the term (appearing in the
proof passage and denoting the formula to be proved) under the module, and
receives the result (which is an XML document) from the CafeOBJ system
via the Buﬀet server. Based on the results and the proof score, Gateau makes
an XML document of them, saves it as a ﬁle and passes the ﬁle name to PSP.
The current implementation of Gateau is written in Perl and consists of
about 1,400 lines. In the rest of this subsection, we describe proof scripts and
how to generate proof scores based on proof scripts.
4.2.1 Proof Scripts
For each predicate pi (denoted by operator invi) to be veriﬁed, we write
a proof script from which a proof score of pi is generated. In a proof
script of pi, for each action operator a denoting transition τj1,...,jmj , we
give predicates such as ci1 , . . . , cini that are used to split cases and formu-
las such as invι1(s, tι11, . . .), . . . invικ(s, tικ1, . . .) that are used to strengthen
the induction hypothesis invi(s, xi1, . . . , ximi) for the induction case that
τj1,...,jmj preserves pi. Such predicates and formulas are given in the form
of rewriting rules. The rewriting rules for predicates ci1 , . . . , cini and formulas
invι1(s, tι11, . . .), . . . invικ(s, tικ1, . . .) look like
trans predicates(a(S,Yj1 , . . . ,Yjmj )) => ci1 .
· · ·
trans predicates(a(S,Yj1 , . . . ,Yjmj )) => cini .
trans lemmas(a(S,Yj1 , . . . ,Yjmj )) => invι1(s, tι11, . . .) .
· · ·
trans lemmas(a(S,Yj1 , . . . ,Yjmj )) => invικ(s, tικ1, . . .) .
Operators predicates and lemmas are used as keywords to write such predi-
cates and formulas. The reason why such predicates and formulas are given in
the form of rewriting rules is that we can use the CafeOBJ systems to parse
rewriting rules and do not have to implement another parser for such predi-
cates and formulas. Proof scores are generated based on such predicates and
formulas, which is next described.
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4.2.2 How to Generate Proof Scores
Given predicate pi (denoted by operator invi) to be veriﬁed, predicates ci1 ,
. . . , cini used to split cases and formulas invι1(s, tι11, . . .), . . . invικ(s, tικ1, . . .)
used to strengthen the induction hypothesis invi(s, xi1, . . . , ximi), then a proof
score of pi is generated and checked as follows:
(i) Base case: Gateau has the CafeOBJ system reduce term invi(init, xi1,
. . . , ximi) under module INV and generates an XML document of the
proof passage and the result.
(ii) Induction cases: For each action operator a denoting transition τj1,...,jmj ,
for each proof passage to be checked a temporary module PROOF TMP is
generated and a term denoting a formula to be proved is reduced under
PROOF TMP in the following way (let ci0 be cτj1,...,jmj ):
k := 1; stack := empty; push(stack, {ci0}); push(stack, {¬ci0});
while stack = empty do
Cs := pop(stack); (* let Cs be {c′1, . . . , c
′
n′}. *)
Make the module
mod PROOF TMP {
pr(ISTEP)
op y
1m1
: -> V1m1 . . . . op yjmj
: -> Vjmj .
Declaration of equations denoting c′1, . . . , c
′
n′ .
eq s′ = a(s, yj1 , . . . , yjmj
) .
} ;
Let T be istepi(xi1, . . . , ximi);
Have the CafeOBJ system reduce T under PROOF TMP;
if the result is true then
(* The proof succeeds in the case Cs. *)
Generate an XML document of the proof passage and the result;
else if the result is false then
Let T be SIHi implies istepi(xi1, . . . , ximi);
Have the CafeOBJ system reduce T under PROOF TMP;
Generate an XML document of the proof passage and the result;
(* If the result is true, the proof succeeds in the case Cs. *)
(* If not, other lemmas may be needed. *)
else if k ≤ ini then
push(stack,Cs ∪ {ck}); push(stack,Cs ∪ {¬ck}); k := k + 1;
else
Let T be SIHi implies istepi(xi1, . . . , ximi);
Have the CafeOBJ system reduce T under PROOF TMP;
Generate an XML document of the proof passage and the result;
(* If the result is true, the proof succeeds in the case Cs. *)
(* If not, further case analysis and/or other lemmas may be needed. *)
ﬁ ﬁ ﬁ;
od
k is an integer variable and stack is a stack of predicate sets. push and pop
are usual operators of stacks. mod is the keyword for declaring modules
and pr is the keyword for importing modules.
Each predicate c′k′ is the form l1 ∧ . . . ln′k′ or ¬(l1 ∧ . . . ln
′
k′
), where
each lκ is a literal, namely the form ακ or ¬ακ, and ακ is an atomic
formula. In the case that c′k′ is the form ¬(l1∧. . . ln′k′ ), we declare equation
c′k′ = false. In the case that c
′
k′ is the form l1 ∧ . . . ln′k′ , we declare an
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equation for each lκ. In the case that lκ is the form ¬ακ, we declare
equation lκ = false. In the case that lκ is the form ακ, if ακ is the form
left = right , we declare equation left = right, and otherwise we declare
equation lκ = true.
4.3 PSP
Given an XML document of a proof score and the results of reducing the
proof passages in the proof score, PSP generates an HTML document. When
an HTML document generated by PSP is ﬁrst displayed on a web browser,
proof passages for which results are not true and their results are shown, and
other proof passages (for which the proof has succeeded) are hidden. Proof
passages are hierarchically shown according to the predicates used to split
cases and each proof passage is clickable, allowing the proof passage to appear
and disappear. The current implementation of PSP is written in XSLT (XSL
Transformations; see www.w3.org/TR/xslt) and consists of about 600 lines.
5 A Case Study: A Mutual Exclusion Protocol
We describe a case study that Buﬀet has been applied to the veriﬁcation that
a simple mutual exclusion protocol has the mutual exclusion property. The
protocol repeatedly executed by multiple processes can be written as
l1: Remainder Section
l2: repeat until ¬fetch&store(lock, true)
Critical Section
cs: lock := false
lock is a boolean variable and is initially set to false. fetch&store(x, v) atom-
ically exchanges the value of variable x with value v and returns the original
value of x. Each process is initially at location l1.
5.1 Modeling and Speciﬁcation of the Mutual Exclusion Protocol
Let B, P and L be types of boolean values, process IDs and locations (l1,
l2 and cs). The mutual exclusion protocol is modeled as the OTS SMX such
that 1) OMX consists of lock : Υ → B and loci : Υ → L for i ∈ P , 2)
IMX is {υ ∈ Υ | ¬lock(υ) ∧ ∀i ∈ P.(loci(υ) = l1)}, and 3) TMX consists of
try i : Υ → Υ, enter i : Υ → Υ and leave i : Υ → Υ, for i ∈ P , whose eﬀective
conditions are ctryi(υ) ≡ (loci(υ) = l1), center i(υ) ≡ (loci = l2 ∧ ¬lock(υ)) and
cleavei(υ) ≡ (loci = cs) and whose deﬁnitions are:
(i) Let υ′ be try i(υ). If ctryi(υ) holds, then lock(υ
′) = lock(υ) and locj(υ
′) =
(if i = j then l2 else locj(υ)). Otherwise, nothing changes.
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(ii) Let υ′ be enter i(υ). If center i(υ) holds, then lock(υ
′) = true and locj(υ
′) =
(if i = j then cs else locj(υ)). Otherwise, nothing changes.
(iii) Let υ′ be leavei(υ). If cleavei(υ) holds, then lock(υ
′) = false and locj(υ
′) =
(if i = j then l1 else locj(υ)). Otherwise, nothing changes.
SMX is written in CafeOBJ. The signature of the CafeOBJ speciﬁcation of
SMX is
-- any initial state
op init : -> Sys
-- observation operators
bop lock : Sys -> Bool bop loc : Sys Pid -> Loc
-- action operators
bop try : Sys Pid -> Sys bop enter : Sys Pid -> Sys
bop leave : Sys Pid -> Sys
Sys is the hidden sort denoting Υ, Pid is the visible sort denoting P and
Loc is the visible sort denoting L. Constant init denotes any initial state.
Observation operators lock and loc denote observers lock and loci, and action
operators try, enter and leave denote transitions try i, enter i and leavei. The
three action operators are deﬁned in equations as
-- try
eq lock(try(S,I)) = lock(S) .
ceq loc(try(S,I),J) = (if I = J then l2 else loc(S,J) fi)
if c-try(S,I) .
ceq try(S,I) = S if not (c-try(S,I)) .
-- enter
ceq lock(enter(S,I)) = true if c-enter(S,I) .
ceq loc(enter(S,I),J) = (if I = J then cs else loc(S,J) fi)
if c-enter(S,I) .
ceq enter(S,I) = S if not(c-enter(S,I)) .
-- leave
ceq lock(leave(S,I)) = false if c-leave(S,I) .
ceq loc(leave(S,I),J) = (if I = J then l1 else loc(S,J) fi)
if c-leave(S,I) .
ceq leave(S,I) = S if not (c-leave(S,I)) .
Operators c-try, c-enter and c-leave denote ctryi , center i and cleavei, which
are deﬁned as
eq c-try(S,I) = (loc(S,I) = l1) .
eq c-enter(S,I) = (loc(S,I) = l2 and not lock(S)) .
eq c-leave(S,I) = (loc(S,I) = cs) .
5.2 Veriﬁcation of the Mutual Exclusion Protocol
We describe the veriﬁcation that SMX has the mutual exclusion property. For
the veriﬁcation, all we have to do is to prove predicate (loci(υ) = cs∧locj(υ) =
cs) ⇒ (i = j) invariant wrt SMX . The predicate is denoted by operator inv1
deﬁned as
eq inv1(S,I,J) = (loc(S,I) = cs and loc(S,J) = cs implies I = J) .
The operator is declared and deﬁned in module INV. In the module, constants
i and j denoting arbitrary values of sort Pid are also declared. The operator
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Fig. 2. Excerpts from the proof score and the results displayed by Buﬀet (1).
denoting the basic formula to be shown in each induction case is denoted by
operator istep1 deﬁned as
eq istep1(I,J) = inv1(s,I,J) implies inv1(s’,I,J) .
The operator is declared and deﬁned in module ISTEP. In the module, con-
stants s and s’ are also declared.
First of all we do not use any predicates to split cases and any formulas
to strengthen the induction hypothesis and have Buﬀet generate and check
a proof score of inv1(s,i,j) and display the proof score and the results.
Buﬀet reports that seven cases have been checked and the proof has succeeded
in three out of the seven cases. We show in Fig. 2 part of the proof score
and the results displayed by Buﬀet. Small triangles are clickable buttons.
An upside down triangle means that its contents are shown, and a triangle
rotated clockwise by 90 degrees means that its contents are hidden. The
ﬁrst button from top in Fig. 2 corresponds to the induction case of enter i
denoted by enter. There are two proof passages in the induction case. One
corresponding to the second button is shown and the other corresponding to
the last button is hidden. The proof succeeds in the second proof passage but
for the ﬁrst proof passage we need case analysis.
Next we use predicates to split cases and the predicates are given as
-- for try
trans predicates(try(S,P)) => (i = pid1) .
trans predicates(try(S,P)) => (j = pid1) .
-- for enter
trans predicates(enter(S,P)) => (i = pid1) .
trans predicates(enter(S,P)) => (j = pid1) .
trans predicates(enter(S,P)) => (loc(s,i) = cs) .
trans predicates(enter(S,P)) => (loc(s,j) = cs) .
-- for leave
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Fig. 3. Excerpts from the proof score and the results displayed by Buﬀet (2).
trans predicates(leave(S,P)) => (i = pid1) .
trans predicates(leave(S,P)) => (j = pid1) .
But we do not use any formulas to strengthen the induction hypothesis. In
this case Buﬀet reports that 18 cases have been checked and the proof has
succeeded in 15 out of the 18 cases. We show in Fig. 3 part of the proof score
and the results displayed by Buﬀet.
Looking at the proof passage in Fig. 3, we notice that process j is at loca-
tion cs and lock(s) is false in state s, which seems contradiction. Therefore
we conjecture that predicate (loci(υ) = cs) ⇒ lock(υ) is also invariant. The
predicate is denoted by operator inv2 deﬁned (in module INV) as
eq inv2(S,I) = (loc(S,I) = cs implies lock(S)) .
We also declare and deﬁne operator istep2 denoting the basic formula to be
shown in each induction case as istep1 in module ISTEP.
In addition to the predicates to split cases, we also use formulas to
strengthen the induction hypothesis inv1(s,i,j) and the formulas are given
as
trans lemmas(enter(S,P)) => inv2(s,i) .
trans lemmas(enter(S,P)) => inv2(s,j) .
In this case Buﬀet reports that the proof has succeeded in all 18 cases.
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For the veriﬁcation of inv2(s,i), we use the predicates to split cases and
the formulas to strengthen the induction hypothesis:
-- for try
trans predicates(try(S,P)) => (pid1 = i) .
trans predicates(try(S,P)) => (loc(s,i) = cs) .
trans predicates(try(S,P)) => lock(s) .
trans predicates(try(S,P)) => (loc(s,i) = l1) .
-- for leave
trans predicates(leave(S,P)) => (pid1 = i) .
trans predicates(leave(S,P)) => (loc(s,i) = cs) .
trans predicates(leave(S,P)) => lock(s) .
trans lemmas(leave(S,P)) => inv1(s,i,pid1) .
Buﬀet reports that 15 cases have been checked and the proof has succeeded
in all the cases.
Note that the predicate denoted by inv2 is needed to strengthen the induc-
tion hypothesis for the invariant proof of the predicate denoted by inv1 and
vice versa, which means that if each of the proof scores is written individually,
then simultaneous induction[15] is needed.
6 Related Work
BOBJ[8] is an algebraic speciﬁcation language based on order-sorted and
hidden-sorted algebras, which is a sibling language of CafeOBJ. BOBJ im-
plements conditional circular coinductive rewriting with case analysis (c4rw).
Given equations (which are used to split cases) and lemmas, c4rw automat-
ically generates proof scores and checks the proof scores. BOBJ allows us
to specify how to split cases in more detail than Buﬀet, but users who give
equations used to split cases are responsible for whether the whole cases are
covered by the equations. As shown in [8], some problems can be veriﬁed well
with c4rw, but it seems that further research should be done to make it clear
that BOBJ can be appropriately applied to what types of problems. BOBJ is
part of the Tatami system[7]. The Tatami system provides facilities for dis-
playing proofs so as to make them preferably attractive to software engineers
based on algebraic semiotics (which combines algebraic speciﬁcation with so-
cial semiotics). The basic idea behind the facilities may be used to improve
our way of displaying proof scores.
Several proof assistants have been proposed. Among them are Coq[1] and
Isabell/HOL[12]. They provide some automatic proof mechanisms to some
extent, but basically help users construct their proofs. Users feed commands
called tactics into a proof assistant to make progress on their proofs. Tactics
usually reduce a proof goal into zero or more proof sub-goals, which are hope-
fully simpler. But users should select appropriate tactics in order to succeed
in their proofs. This means that users are basically required to have knowl-
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edge and experience to complete their proofs on their own without any proof
assistants, although proof assistants prevent users from making mistakes.
Among the existing tools supporting veriﬁcation of (distributed) systems
with algebraic speciﬁcation languages are Larch Prover (LP)[10] and Maude
Inductive Theorem Prover (Maude ITP)[3]. The design policy of LP is to
make proof assistants easier-to-use especially for engineers, but users of LP
are basically required to have similar skills as those needed to use other proof
assistants. Maude ITP assists veriﬁcation of abstract data types written
in Maude[2], an algebraic speciﬁcation and programming language based on
membership equational logic and rewriting logic, but does not assist veriﬁca-
tion of abstract machines.
7 Conclusion
We have described Buﬀet for generating and displaying proof scores in the
OTS/CafeOBJ method and reported on the case study on the veriﬁcation of
a simple mutual exclusion protocol. In addition to the mutual exclusion pro-
tocol, Buﬀet has been successfully applied to the veriﬁcation that the NSLPK
authentication protocol[11] and the Otway-Rees authentication protocol[16]
have the secrecy property.
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